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Moot Suit Riot: An Alternative View of
Plaintiff Pick-off in Class Actions
Johnathan Lottt

INTRODUCTION

Mootness has long been a hotly contested issue in consumer
class actions. Article III of the United States Constitution
requires that a court have a "case or controversy" before it in
order to hear a case.1 This requirement presents a unique
challenge for class actions because named plaintiffs represent
not just themselves, but the interests of the entire class.
Questions frequently arise about what to do when the named
plaintiff's personal stake in the litigation becomes moot, even
though the other members of the class still retain an interest.
The Supreme Court has held that after a motion for class
certification has been filed, the litigation may proceed on behalf
of the class even after the named plaintiffs case becomes moot. 2
But the Court has never resolved the issue of what to do when
the named plaintiffs case becomes moot before the motion to
certify the class has been filed. Mootness with respect to the
named plaintiff seems especially problematic when it arises due
to a unilateral move by the defendant-often an offer of full
judgment to the named plaintiff-that is commonly described as
"pick off."3 A circuit split has recently emerged on the issue. A
majority of appellate courts, led by the Third Circuit, holds that
mootness would not halt the class action.4 But the Seventh
Circuit recently disagreed, finding instead that a named
t BA 2011, University of Florida; JD Candidate 2014, The University of Chicago
Law School. I would like to thank Professor Tony Casey for providing valuable insights
and ideas, which helped make this Comment possible.
1 US Const Art III, § 2.
2 United States Parole Commission v Geraghty, 445 US 388, 388 (1980).
See, for example, Deposit Guaranty National Bank v Roper, 445 US 326, 339
(1980). See also notes 6 and 15 and accompanying text.
4 See, for example, Weiss v Regal Collections, 385 F3d 337, 347-48 (3d Cir 2004).
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plaintiff could not maintain a class action when her interest had
become moot prior to a motion for certification. 5
This issue is critical to the viability of class action suits
generally and to consumer protection suits specifically. Courts,
including the Supreme Court, express great concern over the
ability of defendants to "buy off" named plaintiffs through
settlement offers and thus dismantle potential class action
suits. 6 In consumer protection actions, this could indefinitely
delay litigation and thwart vindication of consumer rights
against corporate defendants. On the other hand, allowing moot
suits to proceed raises serious constitutional concerns and
undermines the policy of encouraging settlement.
Although previous commentators have considered the issue,
none have directly considered the Seventh Circuit's recent
approach. Nor, perhaps more significantly, have any critically
considered the practical outcomes of these competing
approaches. While the pick-off problem is a long-standing
concern in consumer class action litigation, the issue might not
be problematic in long-run equilibrium so long as the courts
acknowledge and anticipate the problem. The debate over the
issue has traditionally been about balancing concerns over pick
off with worries about running afoul of the mootness doctrine;7
yet if pick off is not in fact a problem, constitutional concerns
should dominate.
This Comment proceeds as follows. In Part I, I summarize
both longstanding and recent judicial opinions on the matter,
and then compare the various approaches taken by courts. I
next argue, in Part II, that the minority position of the Seventh
Circuit is a valid solution to the pick-off problem. I show that the
seemingly hardline minority approach affords at least as much
protection to class action plaintiffs as the seemingly proconsumer majority approach. Finally, I suggest that the
minority approach is the more workable approach as it provides
adequate protection to consumers without raising the serious
constitutional concerns of the majority approach.

5

6

Damasco v Clearwire Corp, 662 F3d 891, 896 (7th Cir 2011).
See Roper, 445 US 326 at 339.

Compare id at 339 (expressing deep concern over the pick-off problem), with id at
345 (Powell dissenting) (arguing that the Court's solution to the pick-off problem is
unconstitutional and incompatible with the mootness doctrine).
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I. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Article III of the US Constitution allows only "cases" and
"controversies" to come before the courts.8 As the Supreme Court
has noted, "[i]t is a basic principle of Article III that a justiciable
case or controversy must remain extant at all stages of review,
not merely at the time the complaint is filed."9 If a defendant
offers the plaintiff all the relief she asks for prior to a court's
judgment, then the case necessarily becomes moot.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure encourage this
practice. Rule 68 allows a defendant to make an offer of
judgment to a plaintiff in order to facilitate settlement.1 0 If this
offer is for all the relief sought, then the plaintiff can seek no
further relief from the courts and so the case is moot. 1 If the
offer is in fact for full judgment, then the claim becomes moot
regardless of whether the plaintiff attempts to reject the offer,
since the plaintiff would necessarily receive no additional benefit
from further litigation. However, in order to moot the claim, it
must actually include all relief sought, possibly including
attorney's fees. 12
This is quite sensible for individual claims, but is somewhat
problematic in the context of class actions.13 A named plaintiff in
a class action suit represents not only herself but also the
interests of the entire class.14 A crafty defendant could thus use

8 US Const Art III,
9
10

§ 2.
United States v Juvenile Male, 131 S Ct 2860, 2864 (2011) (quotations omitted).

FRCP 68.

11 1 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and Commentary Rule 68 ("An offer of
judgment that would give the plaintiff all the relief that he is entitled to can lead to the
court dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the mootness
doctrine."). Note, however, that the offer need not necessarily come under Rule 68 so long
as it is for all the relief requested, although Rule 68 seems to be the most common form.
For an example of an offer of full judgment not made under Rule 68, see Damasco v
Clearwire Corp, 662 F3d 891, 896 (7th Cir 2011) ("Although these decisions address
offers that, unlike [defendant's], were made under Rule 68, their same analysis seems to
apply to any offer of complete relief."). In Damasco, the defendant made its offer under
state law provisions that were similar, but not identical, to Rule 68. Id.
12 Thorogood v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 595 F3d 750, 753 (7th Cir 2010) ("In order to
moot the case, the offer must include a reasonable attorney's fee.").
'3 See Charles Alan Wright, et al, 13C Federal Practice and Procedure
Jurisprudenceand Related Matters § 3533.9.1 (Thomson Reuters 3d ed 2013) ("Rule 68
fits poorly with class-action practice in any event.").
14 Charles Allan Wright and Mary Kay Kane, 20 Federal Practice and Procedure
Deskbook § 77 (Thomson Reuters 2012) ("[T]he named representatives must be such as
will fairly ensure the adequate representation of [all the class members].").
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Rule 68 offers to methodically moot the case of every named
plaintiff that attempts to bring suit, thereby "picking off"
plaintiffs and indefinitely delaying the class action litigation.15
Given the significance of the issue and the potential for
abuse of the class action mechanism, the Supreme Court has
considered the issue several times. However, it has never
specifically addressed the issue of mooting a case prior to the
motion for certification, and its precedent has left substantial
room for debate. A sophisticated analysis of this issue requires a
detailed explication of the existing case law.' 6
A.

Supreme Court Precedent
1.

Sosna v Iowa.

In 1975, the Supreme Court first substantively addressed
the issue of a class action case becoming moot in Sosna v Iowa.17
In Sosna, a woman filed a class action suit alleging the
unconstitutionality of an Iowa law which maintained a one-year
residency requirement in order to seek a divorce in the state.18
After a three-judge panel convening for the Northern District of
Iowa determined the rule was constitutional, the one-year time

15 See Joseph M. McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions

§ 4:28 (Thomson
Reuters 9th ed 2012) ("The applicable principles are mindful of the potential mischief
that could flow from permitting Rule 68 judgment offers of judgment to become a vehicle
to 'pick off' a representative plaintiff and thereby frustrate the objective of Rule 23 to
permit the assertion of small claims."); William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions
§ 2:15 (Thomson Reuters 5th ed 2012) ("[Tjhe defendant may effectively prevent judicial
review by 'picking off' named plaintiffs before the court can rule on, or even before
plaintiffs can make, a motion for class certification.").
" After this paper was submitted for final publication, the Supreme Court revisited
the issue of plaintiff pick-off in Genesis Healthcare Corp v Symczyk, 133 S Ct 1523
(2013). However, Genesis should not have much bearing on the issues and theories
discussed in the paper both because the case was narrowly tailored to its facts, see
Genesis, 133 S Ct at 1533 (Kagan dissenting) ("The situation [Genesis] addresses should
never again arise."), and because it is distinguishable from the line of circuit cases at
issue in this paper, see Chen v Allstate Insurance Co, 2013 WL 2558012 (ND Cal)
("Genesis, which was an FLSA collective action, is easily distinguishable from Pitts.").
The Court also specifically chose not to address the broader pick-off issue. See
Genesis, 133 S Ct at 1528-29 ("While the Courts of Appeals disagree whether an
unaccepted offer that fully satisfies a plaintiffs claim is sufficient to render the claim
moot, we do not reach this question."). However, subsequent literature might attempt to
provide a more in-depth analysis of the Genesis decision with respect to pick-off in class
action suits.
"

is

419 US 393 (1975).
Id at 395-96.
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period lapsed, effectively mooting the named plaintiffs interest
in the case.' 9
The United States Supreme Court, however, held that this
did not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear
the class action. 20 There was a critical distinction, it held,
between bringing the action as an individual (which would have
been moot) and bringing the action on behalf of a class. 2 1 The
Court made clear that once the class became certified, "the class
of unnamed persons described in the certification acquired a
legal status separate from the interest asserted by appellant."22
The Court seemed to present this rationale as a sort of analogue
to the common exception to the mootness doctrine in which a
case is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 23 While this
case did not fit precisely into that category, 24 it was a situation
in which "the issue sought to be litigated escapes full appellate
review at the behest of any single challenger," and so, the Court
held, the issue "does not inexorably become moot by the
intervening resolution of the controversy as to the named
plaintiffs." 25 However, the Court limited its new rule to cases in
which individual cases would normally dissipate prior to the full
resolution of litigation, 26 and sought not to disturb any previous
Article III jurisprudence. 27

Id at 398-99.
Id at 399-402.
21 Sosna, 419 US
at 399.
22 Id. The Court implied that a court would have more
discretion over mootness
once the class became certified, noting that "[o]nce the suit is certified as a class action,
it may not be settled or dismissed without the approval of the court." Id at 399 n 8.
23 Id at 399-401. Where a claim is likely to occur frequently
but can never be
litigated because each individual occurrence becomes moot so quickly that no court can
rule on the matter, the case is often determined to be "capable of repetition, yet evading
review." In such cases, the timeframe of mootness for the purposes of class certification
relates back to the time of filing, so that the case can be litigated and the defendant
punished even though the named plaintiff's claim is moot by the time of decision. Id at
402 n 11. See also Charles Alan Wright, et al, 13C Federal Practice and Procedure
Jurisprudenceand Related Matters § 3533.8 (Thomson Reuters 3d ed 2013) ("Courts ...
frequently deny mootness on the ground that the acts are 'capable of repetition, yet
evading review."')
24 Sosna, 419 US at 400.
25 Id at 401.
26 Id at 402.
27 Id. As the Court noted, "[An Article III] controversy may exist, however, between
a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named plaintiff, even
though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot." Id.
19

20
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Justice White, however, dissented. 28 In his view, the Article
III standing requirements must apply uniformly to individual
suits and class actions. 29 As he noted, this case had become onesided and had lost the adversarial quality necessary to satisfy
the constitutional "case or controversy" requirement. 30 The issue
to him seemed to be one of adequate representation, and he
noted that "[n]one of the anonymous members of the class is
present to direct counsel and ensure that class interests are
being properly served." 31 He argued that the precedent that the
majority used in order to derive the logic of its position did not
lend itself to this situation and that it undermined established
Article III standing requirements. 32

2.

Gerstein v Pugh.

A month after it handed down its opinion in Sosna, the
Court expanded its holding. In Gerstein v Pugh,33 prisoners
brought a class action lawsuit against the state of Florida; the
class was certified, but they were released from prison before the
suit was fully litigated. 34 The Court dealt with the mootness
issue in one footnote. 35 Although Sosna was limited to cases in
which the litigation would not normally end before the
controversies mooted, the Court believed that this case was an
exception because the length of prison terms are not finite and
the timeframe is not ascertainable when viewed from the
outset. 36 The Court also noted the importance of potential
recurrence, which was very likely in the case at hand. 37 There
would certainly, at any given point, be other plaintiffs with a
live interest in the case.3 8

28
29

Sosna, 419 US at 410 (White dissenting).
Id at 410-11.

3o

Id at 412.

31
32

Id.

3

420 US 103 (1975).

'

Sosna, 419 US at 415 (White dissenting).
Id at 106-10.

35

Id at 110 n 11.

3

Id.
Gerstein, 420 US at 110 n 11.

37

3

Id.
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Deposit GuarantyNational Bank v Roper.

The Court revisited the issue of mootness in class action
suits in 1980, when it decided Deposit Guaranty National Bank

v Roper39 and United States Parole Commission v Geraghty.40
Roper and its sister case, Geraghty, were different from Sosna
and Gerstein in that the former became moot during appeal of a
denied motion for certification, while the latter had already been
certified before the claims became moot.
In Roper, credit card holders brought a class action suit
against a bank alleging violation of state usury laws.41 After the
district court denied the class certification, the defendant made
a settlement offer in the maximum amount to each named
plaintiff.42 Although the plaintiffs declined the offer, the district
court nonetheless entered judgment in plaintiffs' favor, thus
mooting the action. 43 No other plaintiffs sought to intervene, and
the statute of limitations expired for them to do so. 4 4 However,
on appeal, the Fifth Circuit determined that the class action was
not moot and ordered that the class be certified. 45
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a named plaintiff
could maintain an appeal for class certification even after her
individual interest had been mooted. 46 The Court reasoned that
there were more interests at stake than simply the interests of
the named plaintiffs-there was also the responsibility of the
named plaintiff to represent the class, the interests of the
unnamed class members, and the responsibility of the district
court to protect the unnamed interests and the judicial process. 4 7
The Court accordingly distinguished between the right to appeal
the individual claims and the right to appeal the class action.
While the individual claim was moot, "it does not follow that this
circumstance would terminate the named plaintiffs' right to take

445 US 326 (1980).
40 445 US 388 (1980). See Part I.A.4.
41 Roper, 445 US at 328-29.
42 Id at 329. The Court did not specify whether such a motion
was made under
FRCP 68.
4 Id at 329-30.
4 Id at 330.
4s Roper, 445 US at 330.
39

46 Id at 340.
47

Id at 331.
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an appeal on the issue of class certification."48 The named party
retains a stake in the class action, even if not its own claim,
which satisfies Article III requirements. 49 This is because the
ruling on a class action motion is collateral to the merits of the
litigation.50 Such a determination might raise collateral estoppel
or stare decisis issues in future litigation, so the named
plaintiffs retain a personal stake,5 1 allowing the named
plaintiffs to proceed with the appeal. 52 The Court was
particularly concerned over the alternative outcome in which the
plaintiff might attempt to "buy off" or "pick off" named plaintiffs,
thus delaying litigation and wasting judicial resources. 53
The decision, however, was not unanimous. Justice
Rehnquist concurred (and distinguished this case from
Geraghty)54 by noting that the plaintiff in Roper retained an
interest in this case because they had not ever accepted the
settlement offer, and that this case fit within the "evading
review" category.55
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented because
he believed that allowing continued litigation could not pass
Article III muster.5 6 He rejected the majority's argument that
the named plaintiffs could still maintain a stake in the
litigation, noting that the plaintiffs could obtain no relief from
the defendants.5 7 Instead, he argued that it was primarily the
lawyers who would retain an interest.5 8 He also raised concerns
about the adequacy of representation, both practically and in the
context of Rule 23.59 Justice Powell acknowledged the majority's
concern about picking off plaintiffs and wasting judicial
resources, but instead suggested that the legislature, rather
than the judiciary, should address the problem.60
48

Id at 333.

4

Roper, 445 US at 334.

5 Id at 336.
51

Id.

Id at 340.
Roper, 445 US at 339.
54 See Part I.A.4.
5 Roper, 445 US at 340-41 (Rehnquist concurring). See also note 23.
5 Id at 345 (Powell dissenting).
Id at 346 (Powell dissenting).
5 Id at 347 (Powell dissenting).
59 Roper, 445 US at 357 (Powell dissenting).
6 Id at 354-55 (Powell dissenting).
52

5
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United States Parole Commission v Geraghty.

On the same day that the Court handed down Roper, it
announced its decision in Geraghty. In a case procedurally
similar to Roper, a prisoner sued the state on behalf of a class;
his motion for certification was denied, and his case became
moot on appeal. 6 1 But whereas the claim in Roper was mooted
due to the defendant's settlement offer, the Geraghty case
became moot because the plaintiff was released from prison for
reasons unrelated to the litigation.
A five-justice majority, speaking through Justice Blackmun,
held that the appeal could likewise continue even though the
named plaintiff's claim was moot. 6 2 The Court noted the
"inherently transitory" nature of the claim as some
justification, 63 but was even more emphatic in its articulation of
the "flexible character of the Art. III mootness doctrine." 64 The
Court declined to distinguish between a case becoming moot due
to natural expiration and one becoming moot due to the
defendant's actions.6 5 The plaintiff, the Court reasoned, still held
a "personal stake" and could continue to "vigorously" advocate
for the class. 66 The Court noted that in a case like this, an
individual acting as a private attorney general meets the
requirements of Rule 23.67
Justice Powell again dissented-this time joined by three
other justices.68 He questioned the majority's characterization of
mootness as "flexible" as well as its use of the private attorney
general concept to expand appealability. 6 9 Powell took a hardline
approach, arguing that "the practical importance of review

61

Geraghty, 445 US at 394.

62
63

Id at 404.

Id at 399.

'

Id at 400.

65

Geraghty, 445 US at 402.

'

Id at 403-04.

67 Id at 403.
6
Id at 409 (Powell dissenting). Rehnquist and Burger sided with the majority in
Roper, but they switched sides and joined the Geraghty dissent along with Powell and
Stewart, who also dissented in Roper. The majority opinion in Geraghty, allowing appeal
even in the more traditional case of mootness through natural expiration of the claim,
seems broader than the Roper opinion. See also Part I.A.3 (discussing Rehnquist's
concurrence in Roper).
69 Geraghty, 445 US at 409 (Powell dissenting).
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cannot control," nor could the "public interest," when the
necessary constitutional requirements were not satisfied. 70
5.

County of Riverside v McLaughlin.

The last relevant Supreme Court case is County of Riverside
v McLaughlin.7 1 In McLaughlin, an arrestee brought a class
action suit against the police alleging that the police took so
much time in making a probable cause determination about him
that they violated his constitutional rights.7 2 However, the
defendants argued that since the named plaintiff had already
received the sought-after procedure, he lacked standing and his
claim was moot.7 3 The district court rejected this argument, and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 74
The Supreme Court agreed.7 5 Quoting heavily from the
Sosna line of cases, the Court reemphasized that even though
the named plaintiffs claim was indeed moot, "by obtaining class
certification, plaintiffs preserved the merits of the controversy
for our review." 76 The majority decided it did not matter that the
class was not certified until after the named plaintiffs' claims
had already become moot, as the claim was "inherently
transitory."7 7 The Court found that in such inherently transitory
cases, jurisdiction over the case relates back to the status of the
plaintiffs at the time of initial filing, so the case may be litigated
and decided even though the named plaintiff's claim was moot
by the time of judgment.7 8
6.

Brief summary of the Supreme Court jurisprudence.

Thus the current rule is that courts should not dismiss a
class action suit when a named plaintiff's case becomes moot

70

Id at 411-12 (Powell dissenting).

7' 500 US 44 (1991). Note that while all five of circuits to address the mootnessprior-to-certification matter cited Sosna, Gerstein, Roper, and Geraghty, only two of
them-Pitts and Weiss-ited McLaughlin. See Part I.B.1 & n 156.
72 McLaughlin, 500 US at 48.

*

Id at 50.

*

Id at 49-50.

7

Id at 51.

76

McLaughlin, 500 US at 51.

77

Id.

Id. The same logic applies when a case is found to be "capable of repetition, yet
evading review." See note 23 and accompanying text.
78
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after filing the motion for certification. The Supreme Court has
specifically applied this rule to situations where (as in Sosna
and Gerstein) the case becomes moot during appeal after a court
has certified a class, 79 and where (as in Geraghty and Roper) the
case becomes moot during appeal of a denial of the
certification.8 0 Note that the Supreme Court has not formally
drawn a bright-line rule for mootness at the point of the motion
for certification, but lower courts appear to interpret the Court's
rule to extend at least to this point.8 1
B.

Lower Court Rulings and Summary of the Circuit Split

Though the Supreme Court has addressed mootness in class
action suits after the motion for certification has been filed, it
has not addressed the scenario of a case becoming moot prior to
the motion for certification. Several circuits have addressed the
matter directly, resulting in a split in authority. A majority of
circuits, led by the Third Circuit, allows the action to continue
despite mootness. A minority-the Seventh Circuit-does not.
1.

The majority approach of the Third, Fifth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits.

The Third Circuit was the first appeals court to consider the
mootness-prior-to-certification issue directly in Weiss v Regal
Collections.82 Three other circuits-chronologically, the Fifth,
Tenth, and Ninth Circuits-have since followed Weiss and
adopted substantially similar holdings.
In Weiss, the plaintiff filed a class action suit against a debt
collection company, but prior to class certification, the company
made a formal offer under Rule 68 that effectively mooted the
named plaintiff's case. 83 The Third Circuit reasoned, though,
that while the offer mooted the individual's case by providing
the maximum relief, it did not provide full relief to the class. 8 4
The court looked to Supreme Court precedent, especially
Geraghty and Roper, for guidance. It found that the policy
See Parts I.A.1 & I.A.2.
See Parts I.A.3 & I.A.4.
8' See note 161 and accompanying text.
82 385 F3d 337 (3d Cir 2004).
8
Id at 339-40.
84 Id at 341-42.
7

"

542

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2013

purposes underlying these cases, including the primary concern
about "picking off" plaintiffs, dictated that the court should
allow the case to proceed as not moot. 85 It recognized that other
cases on the issue had all dealt with situations in which the
motion for certification had already been made, but thought that
"reference to the bright line event of the filing of the class
certification motion may not always be well-founded." 86 The
court believed that the filing of the petition for certification
should "relate back" to the date the case was filed, so long as
there was no undue delay, so it remanded to give the plaintiff a
chance to do SO. 8 7
The Fifth Circuit considered a similar-though not

identical-issue in Sandoz v Cingular Wireless LLC. 88 The
Sandoz plaintiff brought a putative collective action under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)8 9 against her employer,
Cingular, which mooted the case through a Rule 68 offer for full
judgment.9 0 While acknowledging the distinctions between the
FLSA action and Rule 23 actions, the court still recognized the
concerns about "picking off" plaintiffs from Geraghty and
Roper.91 The court relied on the relation-back doctrine as well as
the reasoning in Weiss and found that a plaintiff should be able
to file the petition for certification (or, in the case, the FLSA
equivalent), even after the individual case has become moot
through an offer of judgment. 92 The court reemphasized that
only when there is no "undue delay" could the plaintiff retain
this option and use the relation-back doctrine. 93
More recently, the Tenth and Ninth Circuits reached
similar conclusions. In March of 2011, the Tenth Circuit handed

down its opinion in Lucero v Bureau of Collection Recovery, Inc.94
" Id at 342-47.
Weiss, 385 F3d at 347.
8
7 Id at 346-48.
8
553 F3d 913 (5th Cir 2008).
" 29 USC §§ 201-219. These actions are distinct, though in many ways similar to
Rule 23 class actions, and courts often look to Rule 23 jurisprudence in evaluating these
actions. See generally Charles Alan Wright, et al, 7B Federal Practice and Procedure
FederalRules of Civil Procedure § 1807 (Thomson West 3d ed 2013).
9 Sandoz, 553 F3d at 913.
9' Id at 918-19.
92 Id at 919-21. See also note 23 and accompanying text (explaining the relationback doctrine).
93 Id at 921.
9
639 F3d 1239 (10th Cir 2011).
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A plaintiff filed a class action against a debt collector that
promptly responded with a full offer under Rule 68.95 Although
the class action litigation proceeded for several months and a
certification motion was later filed, the district court dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the date of the
Rule 68 offer.9 6 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, adopting
the Third and Fifth Circuits' position that an unaccepted
settlement offer will not moot a case where the plaintiff should
have time to file a motion for certification that relates back to
the date of original filing. 97 The court went through an extended
discussion and analysis of the Supreme Court and circuit
precedent to conclude that a named plaintiff retains sufficient
interest to justify Article III standing to bring a class action
even after the defendant has made a full offer of judgment.98 The
court relied heavily on Geraghty's holding that "the personal
stake of the class inheres prior to certification" 99 and concerns
about picking off plaintiffs and waste of judicial resources. 0 0
In August 2011, the Ninth Circuit also aligned itself with
the majority position in Pitts v Terrible Herbst, Inc.101 In Pitts,
an employee filed FLSA and Rule 23 actions against his
employer, who subsequently made a full offer under Rule 68.102
After an extended discussion of the Supreme Court precedent,
the court held that the plaintiffs class action must not be
considered moot. 10 3 The court reasoned that the relation-back
doctrine must apply since the plaintiff's claim was transitory,
albeit not inherently transitory. 104

9
9
9

Id at 1241.
Id.
Id at 1250.
98 Lucero, 639 F3d at 1245-49.
99 Id at 1249, citing Geraghty, 445 US at 406 n 11.
'o Lucero, 639 F3d at 1250.
10 653 F3d 1081 (9th Cir 2011). The court explicitly recognized that it was aligning
itself with the Weiss, Sandoz, and Lucero courts. Id at 1092 n 3.
102
Id at 1085.
103 Id at 1090-91.
104 Id at 1091.
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The minority approach of the Seventh Circuit.

The Seventh Circuit, however, in Damasco v Clearwire
Corp,105 rejected the approach adopted by the four other circuits.
In a familiar fact pattern, a plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit
against a defendant, and the defendant offered full relief prior to
the motion for class certification.106 The plaintiff did not accept
the offer, but the district court nonetheless dismissed the
complaint as moot.10 7
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal. 0 8 The court specifically rejected the approach of
Weiss and its progeny, criticizing the exception to the mootness
doctrine as unnecessary. 0 9 Instead, it relied heavily on its 1994
opinion Holstein v City of Chicago,110 which it declined to
reconsider or overrule."' In Holstein-well before the influence
of Weiss and its progeny-the Seventh Circuit held that a class
action plaintiff who had received a full offer of settlement could
not proceed with the action since the claim had become moot.112
The Holstein court reasoned that the case did not fit within the
Geraghty exception, since there had not yet been a motion for
certification, and did not attempt to extend Geraghty's
holding.1 3 The court likewise determined the claim was not
inherently transitory and therefore did not fall within the
capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception.114
Rather than rejecting or restricting Holstein in light of the
subsequent jurisprudence, as the plaintiff requested, the
Damasco court approved of Holstein and instead criticized the

662 F3d 891 (7th Cir 2011).
Id at 893. There were some distinctions in this fact pattern and the other cases.
Most notably, in this case, the settlement offer did not come formally under Rule 68, but
under a somewhat similar rule while the case was still in state court. The court made
little of this distinction, noting that "[a]lthough [precedential decisions] address offers
that, unlike Clearwire's, were made under Rule 68, their same analysis seems to apply to
any offer of complete relief." Id at 896.
107 Id at 893.
1os Id at 897.
'n
Damasco, 662 F3d at 896.
n0 29 F3d 1145 (7th Cir 1994).
n1 Damasco, 662 F3d at 895.
u1 Holstein, 29 F3d at 1147.
113 Id.
105
106

"'

Id at 1148.
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Weiss line of cases.11 5 The Seventh Circuit rejected a flexible
approach to mootness and instead took a hardline stance on
Article III, explaining that "[t]o allow a case, not certified as a
class action and with no motion for class certification even
pending, to continue in federal court when the sole plaintiff no
longer maintains a personal stake defies the limits on federal
jurisdiction expressed in Article IIJ."116 The court's reasoning
indeed seemed reminiscent of Justice Powell's dissent in Roper,
which had criticized a flexible approach to mootness. 117
The court also acknowledged the buy-off problem which had
troubled so many other courts, but suggested instead that
plaintiffs seeking to avoid this problem should simply move for
certification at the same time that they file the suit.118 The court
lastly determined that this case was not inherently transitory
and therefore did not fall into an exception.11 9
The Seventh Circuit's approach is not entirely novel, as
some district courts (which it did not reference) had previously
adopted this approach. 120 Further, other courts have given clues
to how they might resolve this situation; the Sixth Circuit, for
instance, noted that "where ...

the named plaintiffs claim

becomes moot before certification, dismissal of the action is
required." 121
Summary of Commentary on the Matter

C.

Although no academic article has cited Damasco as of this
writing, there has been some commentary on the question of

us

Damasco,662 F3d at 896.

116 Id.
117 See

note 69 and accompanying text.

118 See Damasco, 662 F3d at 896. The court rejected the argument that this would

lead to premature motions, as extensions and delayed rulings should mitigate this
problem. Id.
119
Id at 897. The court referred to the "established exception for inherently
transitory claims," in which claims are able to proceed even though the named plaintiff's
case is moot. See id. See also note 78 and accompanying text. The Damasco court,
however, did not reference the Ninth Circuit's suggestion in Pitts that claims need not be
inherently transitory so long as they are transitory. See Part I.B.1.
120
See, for example, Ambalu v Rosenblatt, 194 FRD 451, 453 (EDNY 2000).
121
Brunet v City of Columbus, 1 F3d 390, 399 (6th Cir 1993). But in Brunet, unlike
the other cases discussed, the defendant actually accepted the offer of settlement. Id at
400.
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whether a defendant can unilaterally moot a named plaintiffs
case prior to the motion for certification. 122
David Koysza, for instance, criticizes the problematic nature
of the pick-off problem even before the Weiss court adopted its
solution.123 He identifies several perverse policy outcomes from
allowing defendants
to pick
off plaintiffs,
including
overdeterring class action plaintiffs, creating multiple suits,
creating a race to the courthouse, and creating arbitrary timing
requirements for class action suits. 1 2 4
Andrew Campanelli, similarly, makes an argument that
picked off claims should not be rendered moot. 12 5 He identifies
three approaches to the solution, including a narrow approach
(very similar to Damasco, though not citing Damasco) and a
broad approach (citing Weiss).126 He then advocates for more
expansive adoption of the Weiss approach. 127
Daniel Zariski, et al, by contrast, characterize four
approaches to the solution, including the narrow and broad
approaches. 128 The authors, however, are much more critical of
the Weiss approach,
especially from a constitutional
perspective.1 29 They propose a novel "test" that they believe
would be a better resolution to the issue: Rule 68 offers must
extend to the whole class, rather than just to the named plaintiff
in order to be valid.130

Note that no relevant law review articles, at the time of this writing,
have
engaged in any meaningful discussion of Sandoz, Lucero, Pitts, or Damasco.
123David Hill Koysza, Note, Preventing Defendants from Mooting Class Actions by
Picking Off Named Plaintiffs, 53 Duke L J 781, 782 (2003). Note that Dennis Lueck has
also advocated for a wider adoption of Weiss as a potential solution to the picking off
problem. See Dennis Lueck, The Third Circuit Adopts the Relation-Back Doctrine to
Prevent Defendants from "Picking Off"Representative Plaintiffs of Putative Class Actions
122

in Weiss v. Regal Collections, 50 Vill L Rev 1285, 1307 (2005).
124

Id at 793-96.

M. Andrew Campanelli, Note, You Can Pick Your Friends, but You Cannot Pick
Off the Named Plaintiffof A Class Action: Mootness and Offers of Judgment Before Class
Certification,4 Drexel L Rev 523, 523 (2012).
126 Id at 534-35.
127 Id at
542.
128 Daniel A. Zariski, et al, Mootness in the Class Action Context: Court-Created
Exceptions to the "Case or Controversy" Requirement of Article III, 26 Rev Litig 77, 85
125

(2007).
129

Id at 108.

"2 Id at 113.
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II. THE IRRELEVANCE OF THE PICK-OFF "PROBLEM" AND THE
BENEFITS OF THE

DAMASCO APPROACH

As discussed above, courts are split on their treatment of
the situation when a defendant moots a class action by
extending an offer of judgment to a named plaintiff before the
plaintiff has moved for certification. A majority of circuits, led by
the Third Circuit in Weiss, would allow the class action to
continue, while the Seventh Circuit would dismiss that claim as
moot.
This Comment, however, makes the novel argument that
the actual outcomes under either rule will be nearly identical,
such that the Seventh Circuit's approach will not actually result
in pick offs. Due to the constitutional and practical concerns
with the Third Circuit's approach, this Comment then argues
that the Seventh Circuit's approach is the best solution to the
pick-off problem.
A.

Assessing Outcomes under Each Rule

The problem that arises when a defendant moots a named
plaintiffs' case prior to certification is one that cuts to the very
core of the class action lawsuit. The different rules-broadly
described as the Weiss approach and the Damasco approach 1 31 could have vastly different implications on the incentives to
bring and litigate a class action suit, particularly in the field of
consumer protection where named plaintiffs often have very
small individual interests. To fully understand these
implications, it is important to consider the plight of a litigant
under each outcome and what result might be expected in each.
1.

The fixed outcome under the Weiss rule.

Consider first the case of a hypothetical plaintiff's attorney
in the Third Circuit, which has adopted the Weiss approach,

131
To reiterate, the "Weiss approach" is the rule, first set forth by the Third
Circuit
in Weiss and since adopted by three other circuits, that states that class actions may
proceed to certification even if the defendant attempts to moot the named plaintiff's case
through a full offer of settlement. See Part IB.1. The "Damasco approach" is the
alternative rule, adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Damasco, that such an offer
completely moots the named plaintiff's interest in the case and the suit must therefore
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Part II.B.2.
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where a case may continue even after a named plaintiffs case
becomes moot due to a defendant's offer of judgment.
Suppose a consumer ("Consumer"), who was outraged after
purchasing her children large amounts of a product that
marketed itself as having "health benefits," comes to the lawyer
for advice. 132 The damages of the class members are small and
somewhat speculative, so a class action would be the best way to
handle the litigation. 133 The lawyer files suit against the
manufacturer ("Manufacturer), with Consumer as the named
plaintiff. The lawyer agrees to take the suit on a contingency fee
basis, only receiving payment if she prevails against, or settles
with, the manufacturer.
Manufacturer, given the Weiss rule, would not be able to
stop the case by making a full offer of relief to Consumer; it
would not be able to simply pick her off and wait for another
named plaintiff to surface. The plaintiff, by law, retains a stake
in the litigation until such time as a timely motion for
denied and appeals have been
certification has been
134
exhausted.
This would mean that if Manufacturer wanted to pick off
the suit, it would have to offer full judgment to the entire class.
This would be significantly more expensive than offering full
judgment to the named plaintiff alone. In fact, it would be
prohibitively expensive. Class actions frequently settle at a price
that is only a fraction of the total amount that could be claimed;
some have gone so far as to argue that they "always settle."13 5 If
this is the case, then Manufacturer will have no incentive to
offer a full judgment to the class, but will instead wait until it is
better able to weigh the costs and benefits of a more limited,
negotiated
settlement.
Negotiating
a settlement
with

132 This hypothetical is loosely based off Williams v GerberProducts
Co, 552 F3d 934
(9th Cir 2008).
133 Second Amended Complaint, Williams v Gerber Products Co,
Civil Action No '05
CV 1278 JM (JFS), 1 3 (SD Cal filed Jan 9, 2006) (available on Westlaw at 2006 WL
528322).
"n Pitts, 653 F3d at 1092.
'3
For a description of such an argument, see Charles Silver, "We're Scared to
Death'" Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 NYU L Rev 1357, 1363-65 (2003). The
(heavily debated) concern is that class actions, after a certain point, will settle regardless
of their merits in order to avoid exorbitant legal fees, and this settlement will typically
be very favorable to the plaintiffs' attorneys. See Milton Handler, The Shift from
Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-the Twenty-Third Annual
Antitrust Review, 71 Colum L Rev 1, 9-10 (1971).
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Consumer's attorneys is Manufacturer's best option in this
case. 136
Consumer, for her part, probably does not have much to do
with any of this, as individual litigants, even named plaintiffs,
tend to have very low individual stakes and interest in large
class action cases. 137
2.

The Damasco option.

Now consider a hypothetical plaintiffs' attorney in the
Seventh Circuit, which has adopted the Damasco rule that full
judgment to the named plaintiff prior to certification will end
the case. In the same fact pattern as above, the lawyer must
first decide whether to file a motion for certification concurrently
with the suit.
If the lawyer does file the motion concurrently, the outcome
will be exactly the same as in the Third Circuit-the class action
suit could not be derailed by a settlement offer to the named
plaintiff, and the named plaintiff would retain an interest until
the motion was decided and appeals exhausted.138 There is some
debate over whether an early filing of this motion might result
in a hastened and lower-quality motion for certification.
Although if courts are indeed fair about extensions and allowing
time for discovery, as the Seventh Circuit suggested they would
be, this should not make any difference. 139
1a6
This limited settlement contrasts with an offer of full judgment to the class since
full judgment to the plaintiff (pick off) would not end the suit. Litigation to the point of
judicial resolution, of course, is a possible alternative. But again this seems rare in nonfrivolous class action suits. See note 135 and accompanying text.
137 See Nantiya Ruan, Bringing Sense to Incentives: An Examination of
Incentive
Payments to Named Plaintiffs in Employment DiscriminationClass Actions, 10 Empl Rts
& Empl Pol J 395, 411 (2006) ("In many consumer or securities class actions, the classes
are so large that there are low individual stakes, which result in limited interest by the
named plaintiffs."). See also Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'
Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U Chi L Rev 1, 41 (1991).
138
See note 134 and accompanying text. See also Damasco, 662 F3d at 896 ('"The
pendency of that motion protects a putative class from attempts to buy off the named
plaintiffs.")
139
Damasco, 662 F3d at 896. The Seventh Circuit suggested that there would be no
problem with "ask[ing] the district court to delay its ruling to provide time for additional
discovery or investigation." Id. It went so far as to admonish district courts that they
must allow time for appropriate discovery, lest they abuse their discretion. Id at 897.
Such forceful support for this option suggests that plaintiffs who file concurrently in this
jurisdiction would not suffer any prejudice or disadvantage relative to waiting longer to
file. For a more skeptical view, see Koysza, Note, 53 Duke L J at 799-800 (cited in note
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Whether to file concurrently, shutting down the possibility
of pick offs, or file later, thus preserving the option of being
bought off, becomes a tactical decision that the plaintiffs' lawyer
must make. The Damasco rule thus creates an option for the
plaintiff.
In which situations, though, might a plaintiffs' lawyer want
to preserve the option of the named plaintiff being bought off?
Remember that the plaintiff and her attorney always have the
option of accepting a full offer of judgment should the defendant
choose to make one. The Damasco rule would just allow the
distinct (and perhaps unusual) situation whereby a plaintiff and
her counsel can, by choosing not to file for certification
concurrently, willingly put herself into a position in which she is
legally able to be picked off by a defendant. This position would
not be possible under a Weiss regime.
Consider first from the plaintiff's attorneys' perspective the
nature of an offer of full judgment to the plaintiff. While it would
result in fewer total fees for the lawyer than the expected value
of pressing forward with the case, it would compensate the
lawyer at the same rate for her time up to that point. This would
in turn free up the lawyer to pursue other projects, so the lawyer
should be indifferent between the options, assuming a steady
flow of business and equal hourly income as between the two
situations. 140
But there is also a downside to allowing pick off. Willingly
preserving the pick-off option might signal to the defendant
either a lack of confidence in the long-term viability of the case
or a degree of the frivolity in the case, implying that the case is
simply an attempt to extract quick cash from the defendant. The
defendant presumably would not want to pick off such a nonviable or frivolous case, as doing so would create a moral
hazard-the defendant would open itself to many similar
frivolous suits and the cost of settling all of them would exceed
the cost of litigation of a single case.141

123).
140 However, the literature suggests some common
calculations of fees, including
calculations supported by many courts, may undercompensate plaintiffs' attorneys
because they are less likely include "multipliers" that reflect the level of risk assumed by
an attorney working for a contingency fee. See, for example, Peter H. Huang, A New

Options Theory for Risk Multipliers of Attorney's Fees in Federal Civil Rights Litigation,
73 NYU L Rev 1943, 1949 (1998).
14
In other words, if the defendant picked off a suit that seemed frivolous because it
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Thus in most conceivable cases, the option created by the
Damasco rule does not matter. A confident plaintiffs' lawyer
would want to prevent the possibility of pick off by filing
concurrently,14 2 while the decision not to file concurrently should
not affect the outcome in a weaker case. 143
Consider also the issue from the perspective of the plaintiff,
Consumer. Named plaintiffs, unlike the attorneys that represent
them, have fairly low stakes in the outcomes of a large class
action suit.144 A named plaintiff might prefer a personal full
settlement offer, in which she would receive more compensation,
though this might come at the expense of the rest of the
potential class.145 Not all named plaintiffs would prefer this
option, and plenty of named plaintiffs turn down the offer for
full settlement.146 But this Damasco "option" creates an
additional benefit for named plaintiffs that might prefer
personal settlement, giving them an additional way of profiting
off the case and thus additional incentive to bring their concern
thought it would be cheaper than litigating, it might establish a reputation for paying off
frivolous plaintiffs. Many more plaintiffs, looking to make some easy cash, would file
frivolous suits against the defendant. The cost of picking off all the new plaintiffs could
become more expensive than just litigating the first plaintiffs suit and establishing a
hardline reputation of not settling frivolous suits.
142
Even the Weiss court predicted this outcome. See Weiss, 385 F3d at 348 n 19 ("To
hold otherwise would predictably result in a plaintiff who seeks class relief in a
consumer representative action filing a motion for class certification at the time of filing
the class complaint."). The court did not approve of this result, but its concerns seem
mitigated in a jurisdiction where the rule is set and courts are prepared to deal with
expected concurrent filings. See note 139 and accompanying text.
143 If there was asymmetric information between the plaintiff and defendant-for
example, the plaintiff knows she has a weak case, while the defendant believes that the
case is strong-then the outcome may be pick off. However, if the defendant understands
this strategy, then the plaintiff's choosing not to file concurrently may be a signaling
mechanism, signaling that the case is not meritorious. The signal itself prevents pick off,
and the rule again does not matter as pick off will not occur in either outcome. Further,
even if pick off does happen, it would not offend our notions of justice; this is more of a
nuisance to the defendant than an affront to the purposes of class action litigation, since
the lawsuit was not meritorious and would later be thrown out of court.
144 See note 137.
141 Pick-off attempts are often made for amounts higher than
actual damages a
named plaintiff would stand to receive in a class action. See, for example, Pitts, 653 F3d
at 1085. In Pitts, plaintiff received a "pick off" offer of $900 even though he only sought
$88 personally in the class action suit. Id. Perhaps this is to compensate the named
plaintiff, who often receives some sort of additional benefit compared to normal class
members as compensation for their time, or perhaps it is just a relatively low-cost
attempt to induce the plaintiff into accepting the pick off and thus delaying the
litigation.
146
See, for example, Pitts, 653 F3d at 1085 (noting the plaintiff refused full offer of
judgment).
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to a lawyer in the first place or perhaps to cooperate with the
lawyer throughout the process in the early stages. If the costs to
the success of the class as a whole outweigh these benefits, the
lawyer can mitigate these costs ex ante by filing concurrently
and thus ensuring the same outcome as in a Weiss jurisdiction.
The lawyer, after all, has a duty to protect the interests of
unnamed potential class members. 14 7
3.

Takeaway: the outcomes are substantially the same.

Thus it appears that, as between the seemingly very
different rules of Damasco and Weiss, at best, the Damasco rule
provides additional options to a named plaintiff in pursuing her
case. At worst, the choice of rule does not matter. The Damasco
rule gives the plaintiff the choice of opting into a Weiss-like
regime by filing the motion for class certification concurrently or
of opting out by delaying filing of the motion for certification.
The result probably will not make much difference, but the
plaintiff is made better off simply by retaining the option.
Note that this conclusion does rest on two critical
assumptions. First, filing the motion for class certification
concurrently with the complaint must not add any additional
costs or harm the plaintiffs ability to eventually present a welldrafted motion for certification. If it would, then a Damasco rule,
by forcing the plaintiff to file concurrently, would undermine the
ability of the plaintiff to fully present her case from the outset.
However, if courts adopting this rule are accommodating and
provide sufficient time for discovery and amendment, it seems
that the outcome should be identical to the Weiss regime in
which a plaintiff files suit without the possibility of pick off and
then files a motion for certification as soon as it is ready. 148 Even
147 See Joseph M. McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions § 4:27 (Thomson
Reuters 9th ed 2012) ("[Pire-certification class counsel owe a fiduciary duty not to
prejudice the interests that putative class members have in their class action
litigation."). This might create some tension between the duties the lawyer owes to her
client, the named plaintiff (who may only want to settle for quick cash), and the duties
owed to the rest of the class. This might also create later tensions with FRCP 23(a)(4)
(requiring adequacy of representation for the class). While this Comment does not fully
address this ethical dilemma, this situation should not actually arise frequently because
the defendant will most likely never offer full settlement to a named plaintiff under a
pre-announced Damasco rule, even when the plaintiff puts herself in a position to receive
such an offer by not filing concurrently. See notes 142-143 and accompanying text.
See note 139 and accompanying text. By adopting the Damasco rule, courts lend
18
support to the practice of filing a rough, underdeveloped motion for certification
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courts adopting the Weiss rule require that the motion for
certification be timely filed in order to avoid pick off. 1 49
Second, the courts must announce the rule in order to
actually avoid a pick-off problem in a Damasco regime.
Otherwise, the plaintiff will not know to file concurrently and
may leave herself open to being picked off, as was the case under
50 Filing concurrently as a default position
the facts of Damasco.1
in a jurisdiction that has not established the rule, however,
would only be wise if courts were willing to accommodate early
filing of the motion for certification.15 1
B.

The Weiss Rule and Constitutional Concerns

Though the practical outcomes are substantially similar
under both approaches, concerns about the constitutionality of
each rule are paramount in any discussion of mootness. Article
III limits the subject matter of jurisdiction of federal courts to
actual "cases" and "controversies."15 2 The Supreme Court has
noted that "[t]his case-or-controversy requirement subsists
through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and
appellate.... The parties must continue to have a 'personal
stake in the outcome' of the lawsuit."153 In other words, if at any
point during the litigation one of the two parties loses its
interest in the case-"interest" being "an actual injury traceable
to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision"l 5 4-the case must be dismissed.
The plain language of the mootness doctrine favors the
Damasco approach over the Weiss approach. The named plaintiff
seems to lose her stake in the matter after her personal case
becomes moot, and it is well established that a full offer of

concurrently with the case filing. They should necessarily allow generous room for
amendment as new information arises and the plaintiff's attorney gains more time to
perfect the motion.
149
See, for example, Sandoz, 553 F3d at 921 ("On remand, the district court must
determine .. . whether Sandoz timely sought certification of her collective action.")
'5s See Damasco, 662 F3d at 894.
151 This seems to be the case in the Seventh Circuit, given the appellate court's
adoption of the Damasco rule and its support for concurrent filing. See notes 139, 148.
152
US Const Art III, § 2.
153
Lewis v ContinentalBank Corp, 494 US 472, 477 (1990) (citations and quotations
omitted).
United States v Juvenile Male, 131 S Ct 2860, 2864 (2011).
154
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judgment renders a plaintiffs claim moot.15 5 But the issue is not
that simple. Weiss and its progeny relied heavily on the
Supreme Court decisions in Sosna, Gerstein, Roper, Geraghty,
and McLaughlin for constitutional justification.15 6 These cases
collectively held that class action suits could proceed even if the
named plaintiff's stake became moot during the litigation or
appeals process. 15 7 However, these cases did not address the
situation when a plaintiff's claim becomes moot before the
motion for class certification is filed (or, for that matter, ruled on
by at least the district court).15 8
Extending these cases to plaintiffs who did not file for
serious
present
would
mootness
before
certification
constitutional issues. A class of unnamed plaintiffs only acquires
legal status after certification. 15 9 Allowing named plaintiffs to
continue litigation when their case is moot, when they have not
solidified any extra-personal stake by filing the motion for
certification, represents a significant departure from our
traditional understanding of mootness.16 0 Given that Weiss and
Damasco both provide identical practical outcomes and workable
solutions to the pick-off problem, there appears to be little
reason to wade into uncertain constitutional waters in order to
justify a Weiss regime.
Roper and Geraghty imply that it is the moment of filing the
motion for certification that consummates the legal existence of

"s' See note 11 and accompanying text.
156 See, for example, Weiss, 385 F3d at 344 ("[Tlhe matters addressed in Roper ...
have direct application to the issue presented by this appeal.").
157 For an extended discussion of these cases, see Part I.A.
158 See Weiss, 385 F3d at 343 ("We recognize Roper addressed a different issue.").
The Seventh Circuit has held that a pending, undecided motion for classification is
sufficient to prevent a plaintiffs case from being picked off See Damasco, 662 F3d at 896
("The pendency of [the certification] motion protects a putative class from attempts to
buy off the named plaintiffs."), citing Primax Recoveries, Inc v Sevilla, 324 F3d 544, 54647 (7th Cir 2003).
159 See Sosna, 419 US at 399 (noting that after certification, "the class of unnamed
persons described in the certification acquired a legal status separate from the interest
asserted by appellant").
1o See, for example, Damasco, 662 F3d at 896 ("To allow a case, not certified as a
class action and with no motion for class certification even pending, to continue in
federal court when the sole plaintiff no longer maintains a personal stake defies the
limits on federal jurisdiction expressed in Article III."); Geraghty, 445 US at 412 (Powell
dissenting) ("Indeed, the rule barring litigation by those who have no interest of their
own at stake is applied so rigorously that it has been termed the 'one major proposition'
in the law of standing to which 'the federal courts have consistently adhered ... without
exception."') (citations omitted).
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the unnamed class. 161 The Court's explicit limitation on the
extent of its holding in those cases indicates that, prior to the
motion, a named plaintiff is proceeding only as an ordinary
litigant whose claim can mooted by a full offer of judgment.162
But Weiss and its progeny take the line drawn by the Supreme
Court and essentially extend it all the way to point of the filing
of any suit that purports to be a class action.163 Under this rule,
a named plaintiffs class action suit cannot be mooted by a full
offer of judgment, even though such an offer would moot the
case under any other circumstance. Further, other forms of
mootness (aside from an offer of judgment) would probably still
render a case moot. 164
To address the situations where such mootness would be
problematic to the purposes of class actions, the Supreme Court
carved out a long-standing exception for inherently transitory
cases, cases in which an otherwise meritorious suit cannot be
brought solely because the action necessarily becomes moot
before it can be properly litigated. 165 In such cases, and only in
such cases, the filing of the motion for certification would relate
back to the date of filing the case. 166 But an offer of judgment
does not seem to necessarily push a case into this narrow
category. 167 Even in situations in which a named plaintiff is
While this rule is not explicitly articulated, in both these cases, the courts
allowed litigation to proceed when the case became moot after a motion for certification
had been filed but before the motion had been approved. See Part I.A.3. See also note
159. The Seventh Circuit has more clearly stated this notion. See Damasco, 662 F3d at
895 ("[W]e have long held that a defendant cannot moot a case by making an offer after a
plaintiff moves to certify a class.") Even the Weiss court acknowledged this position
(before expanding it). See Weiss, 385 F3d at 347 ("Nonetheless, reference to the bright
line event of the filing of the class certification motion may not always be well-founded.").
162
See Geraghty, 445 US at 404 ("Our holding is limited to the appeal of the denial
of the class certification motion.").
163 See Weiss, 385 F3d at 348 ("Absent undue delay in filing a motion for class
certification, therefore, where a defendant makes a Rule 68 offer to an individual claim
that has the effect of mooting possible class relief asserted in the complaint, the
appropriate course is to relate the certification motion back to the filing.").
164 The holding of Weiss is so narrow, see note 163, that if the claim became moot for
any reason other than an offer of full judgment-for instance, the claim was resolved in
the natural course of business outside of litigation-that Weiss could not be cited to
argue that case should proceed as not moot.
161
See generally Charles Alan Wright, et al, 13C Federal Practice and Procedure
Jurisprudenceand Related Matters § 3533.8 (Thomson Reuters 3d ed 2013).
16
See, for example, Roper, 445 US at 340-41 (Rehnquist concurring)
(distinguishing between those inherently transitory cases in which the exception applies
and other cases in which the exception does not).
167 See Murphy v Hunt, 455 US 478, 482 (1982) ("The Court has never
held that a
161
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open to being picked off, the class action does not evade review
entirely. There are (or at least should be) other named plaintiffs
out there; indeed, it is usually the lawyer who picks the plaintiff
rather than the plaintiff who picks the lawyer. 16 8 If a client is
"picked off," the lawyer should simply seek out another member
of the class to serve as named plaintiff; unless the statute of
limitations expires, the inability of a lawyer to find any other
class member implies that the case was frivolous.
The relation-back doctrine is not one to be taken lightly; it
is an exception to the strict constitutional mandate that there be
an active controversy between two parties in order for a case to
be heard. 169 The Weiss rule expands the doctrine to its breaking
point. It seems incredibly troubling that these courts make light
of the "inherently" part of the "inherently transitory" rule. 170
Further, courts make this distinction solely for the purpose of
addressing the pick-off problem. The Weiss rule does not, by its
language, extend further than mootness that arises from a full
offer of judgment. 171 Cases in which mootness comes about in
mere physical or theoretical possibility was sufficient to satisfy the test [for the capable
of repetition, yet evading review exception]."). But see Pitts, 653 F3d at 1091 ("Where, as
here, a defendant seeks to 'buy off' the small individual claims of the named plaintiffs,
the analogous claims of the class-though not inherently transitory-become no less
transitory than inherently transitory claims."). Pitts' reasoning seems, though, to make
the pick-off problem greater than it actually is. Given that there is at least the possibility
of finding a new named plaintiff after one has been bought off, this claim must be at
least somewhat less transitory than an "inherently" transitory claim, so the Ninth
Circuit's proposition fails.
16s See John C. Coffee Jr, Understandingthe Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of

Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions,
86 Colum L Rev 669, 681 (1986) ("In some areas of contemporary litigation, the pattern
is typically one of the lawyer finding the client, rather than vice versa."); Charles Alan

Wright, et al, 13C Federal Practice and Procedure Jurisprudenceand Related Matters

§

3533.9.1 (Thomson Reuters 3d ed 2013) ("The Court is apparently reluctant to
recognize openly that named representatives frequently are no more than token clients
for lawyers who in fact provide the motivation and representation that animate a class
action.").
169 For
example, Justice Powell noted that "[tihe essential and irreducible
constitutional requirement is . .. continuing or threatened injury." See Geraghty, 445 US
at 412 (Powell dissenting). He noted further that "the practical importance of review
cannot control. . . . [n]or can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the
necessary individual interest in the outcome." Id at 411-12.
10
See, for example, Pitts, 563 F3d at 1091 ("[W]e see no reason to restrict
application of the relation-back doctrine only to cases involving inherently transitory
claims."); Weiss, 385 F3d at 347 ("Although Weiss's claims here are not 'inherently
transitory' as a result of being time sensitive, they are acutely susceptible to mootness.")
(citations and quotations omitted).
17
See Weiss, 385 F3d at 348 ("ITIherefore, where a defendant makes a Rule 68 offer
to an individual claim that has the effect of mooting possible class relief asserted in the
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other ways would still presumably be dismissed under the Weiss
rule unless they fall under the narrow exception. So the rule
amounts to an ad-hoc workaround of a strict constitutional
prohibition designed solely to deal with a problem-the pick-off
problem. 172 Indeed, this problem is quite offensive to our notions
of justice, but such a constitutionally questionable approach is
an improper way to address it.173
C.

Damasco as a Solution to the Problem

In Part II.A, I showed that as between a jurisdiction that
implements a Weiss rule and one that implements a Damasco
rule, when addressing the problem of forced settlement prior to
the motion for certification, the outcome should not be very
different. In, Part II.B, however, I raised serious concerns with
the constitutionality of the Weiss rule. I now argue that the
Damasco rule is a viable solution to the pick-off problem; the
rule will provide adequate protection for class action suits,
particularly in the realm of consumer protection.
Although Damasco itself has not been seriously addressed
by the literature, some commentators have argued against
substantially similar approaches to the pick-off problem." 174
Their concerns1 75 are valid to the extent that a pick-off problem
complaint, the appropriate course is to relate the certification motion back to the filing of
the class complaint.").
172
Consider the argument of the Weiss court:
Although Weiss's claims here are not "inherently transitory" as a result of
being time sensitive, they are "acutely susceptible to mootness," in light of
defendants' tactic of "picking off" lead plaintiffs with a Rule 68 offer to avoid a
class action. As noted, this tactic may deprive a representative plaintiff the
opportunity to timely bring a class certification motion, and also may deny the
court a reasonable opportunity to rule on the motion.
Weiss, 385 F3d at 347 (citations omitted). The court seems to be acknowledging that the
problem of pick off prior to certification does not fall into any traditionally recognized
exception to the mootness doctrine, but chooses to allow an exception anyway in order to
prevent an unpalatable policy outcome.
173 For additional support, see Damasco, 662 F3d at 896 ("To allow a case,
not
certified as a class action and with no motion for class certification even pending, to
continue in federal court when the sole plaintiff no longer maintains a personal stake
defies the limits on federal jurisdiction expressed in Article III."); Zariski, et al, 26 Rev
Litig at 108 (cited in note 128) ("[T]he Weiss decision is fundamentally inconsistent with
the balance struck by the Supreme Court in Sosna, Geraghty, and Roper.").
174 See, for example, Campanelli, Note, 4 Drexel L Rev at 535, 554 (cited
in note
125).
175 For an example of the concerns about the pick-off problem
under the strict
approach, see Koysza, Note, 53 Duke L J at 794-98 (cited in note 123).
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does exist; such a problem would thwart the very purpose of
class action litigation by allowing a defendant to delay litigation
at little cost until the plaintiff class either becomes discouraged
or the statute of limitations expires. Yet under the Damasco
rule, the defendant cannot use forced settlement to pick off the
plaintiff.17 6 The result is basically a bright-line rule under which
most plaintiffs will file the case and the motion for certification
concurrently and thus prevent pick off entirely. 177 If plaintiffs
choose not to do this, and leave themselves open to pick off, then
it is at least an option in their favor.
Damasco, thus taken as a bright-line rule, will avoid the
problems inherent in the flexibility of the Weiss approach. The
Weiss court rested its decision on the important caveat that
continuation of the class action is only possible when there is no
"undue delay" in filing the certification. 178 This is not a defined
term, and as such will give districts court flexibility in
determining what constitutes undue delay. Unless courts
establish standards for "undue delay," the lack of definition
could create uncertainty for both plaintiffs and defendants and
may produce perverse incentives for forum shopping whereby
plaintiffs file in "friendly" courts. 179 Under Damasco, plaintiffs
would file concurrently and so avoid the possibility of a court
finding that their case became moot because they were too late
in filing their motion. In this way, the Damasco rule should lead
to fewer instances of actual pick off than the Weiss rule.
Damasco therefore is the preferable approach to dealing
with the pick-off problem and advancing the abilities of
plaintiffs, particularly consumer-plaintiffs, to bring meritorious
class action law suits. It provides protection against pick offs for
plaintiffs that is equal to or greater than the protection provided
by Weiss,180 as plaintiffs who file concurrently can never expose

See Part II.A.3.
Note that if this is the case, and all or substantially all plaintiffs in a Damasco
jurisdiction file concurrently, then concurrent filing may become less a strategic option
and more of a conferment of standing to unnamed plaintiffs in a class from the moment
of filing. But this may be a desirable result. See Part II.D.
1s Weiss, 385 F3d at 348. See also Sandoz, 553 F3d at 921.
17o Alternatively, defendants might strategically try to remove a suit or change the
venue.
'so Note again that this assertion rests on the critical assumption that there will be
no additional cost to the plaintiffs suit associated with concurrent filing. See Part II.A.3.
176
177
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themselves to pick off.lal It also avoids the serious constitutional
concerns raised by the Weiss approach. If any court ever found
Weiss to be unconstitutional, plaintiffs in the current pipeline
would be exposed to pick off and would need to hastily file a
motion for certification in order to avoid it.
D.

Additional Considerations

Note the formalism inherent in this Comment's position.
The goal of both the Damasco and Weiss rules is to prevent pick
off, and both do so effectively. Yet the primary difference
between the two views is the degree to which the Article III
standing requirements rests on the mere timing of a motion for
certification. This difference is certainly subtle, and one might
argue that it is a formalism that should not be determinative of
standing for a class action suit. But the existing body of
jurisprudence on mootness nonetheless requires it. Unless and
until the law confers immediate standing to unnamed class
members upon the filing of a class action lawsuit, that standing
cannot arise until a certain formal point in our process, and
Supreme Court precedent seems to say that the point is the
motion for certification. The practice endorsed by Damascofiling the motion for certification concurrently with the suit-is
indeed formalist. Consider that if all class action plaintiffs filed
concurrently at certification, it would be, for all intents and
purposes, identical to conferring Article III standing to unnamed
class members at the moment a suit is filed. But the Damasco
rule is nonetheless a viable solution to the undesirable pick-off
problem that complies with existing law and jurisprudence on
standing in class action suits. The alternative Weiss approach
seems to utilize this same idea-the rule essentially grants
immediate standing to unnamed plaintiffs in cases in which the
pick-off problem might arise. 182 The key difference is that
Damasco solves the problem in a manner that comports with the
large and traditional body of Article III jurisprudence.
181 Under Geraghty, the determination of mootness is made at the time of filing the
motion for class certification. Geraghty, 445 US at 398 ("[M]ootness still can be avoided
through certification of a class prior to expiration of the named plaintiff's personal
claim."). It follows that if a plaintiff files concurrently, there is never any period in which
the expiration of the named plaintiff's personal claim can be brought about by a forced
offer of settlement.
182 See Lucero, 639 F3d at 1249 ("[W]e conclude that a nascent
interest attaches to
the proposed class upon the filing of a class complaint.").
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The novel approach of Zariski, et al, could potentially work
as a more direct solution to the pick-off problem, but it
encounters serious issues in implementation. Zariski, et al,
suggest that, rather than force concurrent filing, courts should
require that a full offer of judgment in a class action suit satisfy
the entire class rather than just the named plaintiff in order to
moot a case.183 This approach would have the practical effect of
preventing pick offs,184 and would also avoid any problems
created by concurrent filing that might be present in a Damasco
regime. 8 5 However, it seems unlikely that the courts would
actually adopt this approach. Rule 68 allows a party to make an
offer of judgment to an "opposing party."186 Until the motion for
certification is filed, the "opposing party" is the named plaintiff
as an individual, not the class.18 7 Courts could not redefine
''opposing party" to include the class without running into the
exact same constitutional issues present in Weiss-perhaps even
more overt ones. It would be difficult to implement this
approach without amending the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to explicitly account for it.
III. CONCLUSION
The federal courts of appeals have developed two competing
solutions as to the problem of what happens when a defendant
makes an offer of judgment to a named plaintiff in a class action
suit, but the plaintiff has not yet moved for certification. A
majority of circuits hold that the class action may continue; the
Seventh Circuit holds that it must be dismissed as moot. After
analysis of existing jurisprudence related to the matter,
including Supreme Court precedent on related issues and the
appellate court decisions on the matter at hand, this Comment
argued that the minority approach recently advocated by the
Seventh Circuit is the superior approach. After critical analysis
Zariski, et al, 26 Rev Litig at 113 (cited in note 128).
See Part II.A.1. The very concept of picking off a plaintiff would impossible if the
defendant must offer relief to the entire class in order to force mootness.
185 This idea is perhaps a more direct approach than either Weiss or Damasco
because it is an overt attempt to derail the very source of the pick-off problem. It would
have the same practical effects as the two judicial rules in that all three would effectively
stop picking off, but it addresses the problem directly rather than indirectly through
interpretation of the standing doctrine.
186
FRCP 68(a).
187 Geraghty seems to support this contention.
See note 181.
183
'8
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of the two approaches, it showed that the Damasco rule will
result in equal or better protection against pick offs by
defendants while avoiding the serious constitutional concerns
raised by other rules.

